Poucas pessoas sabem tanto sobre o comportamento eleitoral na Irlanda (e não só) como Michael Marsh. Vale a pena ler este artigo no Sunday Post sobre o referendo: What did the voters mean when they said No to the Lisbon Treaty? Nem tudo o que lá é dito confere exactamente com o que defendi aqui, pelo que é ainda mais interessante, pelo menos para mim. Algumas passagens:
In this referendum campaign, although five out of six Irish parties, with a combined support of 85 per cent at the last national elections, supported the treaty, only 9 per cent of voters were contacted in person by the Yes side. The No side reached 8 per cent. A small group was contacted by both sides (3 per cent), but 86 per cent were not contacted at all. It seems difficult to maintain that the government or the other parties on the Yes side went all out to secure a victory. Moreover, it is indeed remarkable that the No side, lacking the established infrastructure of party organisations, reached about the same number of voters as the Yes side.
We asked whether Lisbon would have compromised Ireland’s neutrality; made the practice of abortion more likely in Ireland; led to a change in tax on businesses; reduced Ireland’s influence on EU decisions; strengthened the protection of workers’ rights; caused even more unemployment; lost us our European Commissioner for some of the time; and finally, simplified decision-making in the EU. The results indicate that the No arguments seemed to have won the campaign. Substantial majorities agree with their interpretation over the interpretation of the Yes side. Even on abortion, where their arguments were rejected by the Electoral Commission, a significant minority (39 per cent) was concerned that abortion could be brought closer had Ireland voted Yes.
Those most uncertain about their economic future, due to perceived decline in their own living standards in the last year, also tended to vote No. These factors are outside anyone’s immediate capacity to address, although dissatisfaction with the government - equally high at the time of Nice II - is not necessarily associated with a rejection of an EU treaty, at least to the degree it is associated here. Nor is it the case that voters were simply rejecting Europe. Over 40 per cent of No voters supported even more integration over protecting our independence from the EU.
E um gráfico espantoso, que mostra - aqui sim de acordo com o meu argumento - que o problema não foi a abstenção: aqueles que não votaram eram ainda mais hostis ao Tratado. Mais informação sobre a sondagem pós-eleitoral aqui.
Para ficar tudo clarinho, neste blogue, por muito que se tente, não se consegue ser imparcial em relação ao resultado final. Independentemente de simpatias ou antipatias pessoais com os candidatos, quer-se tudo azul.
Survey: Poles support EU's reform treaty Poles would back the European Union's Lisbon Treaty by a wide margin if it were put to a referendum, a newspaper reported Monday. A poll of 1,000 adults found 71 per cent of Poles said they would vote for the reform treaty, which Irish voters rejected in a referendum last week, the Dziennik daily said.
A majority of the Dutch is against the Treaty of Lisbon, according to a poll by Maurice de Hond. But the Netherlands is going ahead with its ratification. If the Netherlands were to hold a referendum now on the new EU treaty, 54 percent would vote against it, De Hond reported. He polled the views of the Dutch after the Irish rejected the treaty last week. A majority (56 percent) wants the Netherlands to also hold a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon. It is an adaptation of the European Constitution, on which a referendum was held in the Netherlands in 2005 - which rejected it by 62 to 38 percent. (...) But there will be no referendum. The Netherlands is going ahead with the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, even though the Irish have rejected it, said Premier Jan Peter Balkenende.
Are referendums on EU treaties decided by voters’ attitudes to Europe (the ‘issue-voting’ explanation) or by voters’ attitudes to their national political parties and incumbent national government (the ‘second-order election model’ explanation)? In one scenario, these referendums will approximate to deliberative processes that will be decided by people’s views of the merits of European integration. In the other scenario, they will be plebiscites on the performance of national governments. We test the two competing explanations of the determinants of voting in EU referendums using evidence from the two Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty. We find that the issue-voting model outperforms the second-order model in both referendums. However, we also find that issue-voting was particularly important in the more salient and more intense second referendum. Most strikingly, attitudes to EU enlargement were much stronger predictors of vote at Nice 2 than at Nice 1. This finding about the rise in importance of attitudes to the EU points to the importance of campaigning in EU referendums.
"A apresentação de um novo modelo da marca de automóveis Skoda arrancou ontem à tarde na Praça das Flores, sob os protestos dos comerciantes e moradores da zona. Em causa está o facto de a Câmara de Lisboa ter autorizado que a organização vedasse o local durante os 17 dias do evento, (...) a troco de 150 mil euros e da reabilitação do jardim central. (...) 'Ia a passar pelo meio do jardim, quando os seguranças apareceram e me barraram a passagem'"