Paulo Portas e Passos Coelho são os líderes políticos cuja aprovação mais desceu. Aqui. Se tivesse tempo, tentaria calcular a probabilidade de duas amostras aleatórias (esta e a do mês anterior) darem resultados quase exactamente iguais, presumindo que a distribuição de intenções no universo é igual.
P.S.- Boa ideia a apresentação de %'s sem casas decimais. A ver se continua.
Graças ao trabalho incansável do Miguel Maria Pereira, bolseiro do projecto POPSTAR (em breve terei novidades que poderão ser interessantes), e da ajuda da ERC, temos agora uma coisa simples mas útil: uma base de dados das sondagens eleitorais desde 2001. Um exemplo abaixo do que se pode fazer com isto: a evolução das intenções de voto no PSD. Porque as sondagens divulgam os resultados de maneira diferente - com e sem indecisos, aplicando filtros que diminuem a % de brancos e nulos, etc. - estes resultados representam a % de intenções de voto no PSD em relação ao total dos 5 maiores partidos, de modo a aumentar a comparabilidade entre as diferentes sondagens. Logo, o que interessa aqui não é tanto uma comparação com resultados eleitorais reais (que serão sempre menores), mas sim a comparação ao longo do tempo. Sinalizei alguns factos políticos relevantes para nos situarmos. A linha é um smoother LOESS a 5%. É melhor clicar na imagem para ver bem.
Julgo que não precisa de muitos comentários. Talvez dizer que o declínio do PSD desde 2011, depois de uma breve fase inicial de sustentação (que Barroso não teve), tornou-se logo de seguida mais acentuado e rápido que o que sofreu desde 2002 e que, hoje, o PSD está com intenções de voto nos mínimos dos últimos 12 anos, mas que esses mínimos já foram atingindos em várias circunstâncias (Santana Lopes, Menezes, Ferreira Leite). A dúvida, claro, é o que pode estar ainda para vir.by Pedro Magalhães
Uma investigadora da Nova SBE, Ana Cláudia Gouveia, no contexto da sua tese de doutoramento, desenvolveu um questionário online sobre pensões de reforma. Era muito importante que o questionário fosse respondido pelo número mais alargado possível de pessoas, pelo que venho pedir-vos ajuda no sentido lhe responderem e circularem o link. Responde-se AQUI. E pode dar um prémio! (a sério).
O link por extenso, para copiarem e enviarem para outros, se puderem: https://novasbe.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6lng3AfIhrmYiCV
Vote intention polls since the last election in Portugal. In spite of the scarcity of polls here, there is little room for doubt on what the three largest parties might be in terms of current voter support. Of the 32 media polls conducted since September 2012, PS has led the PSD in every single one of them, with an average voting intention of 34%. PSD's average in those polls is 27%, giving a 7 points lead to the Socialists. But it may be more already. For the polls conducted in the last four months, that lead is slightly higher: 8 points. CDU is comfortably in 3rd place, with an average of 11% since September.
PSD's decline is steeper than PS's rise, since smaller parties - not the government partner CDS-PP, but rather BE and, especially, CDU - seem to be on the rise too. Not quite like Spain, where IU and UPyD are now worth something like 30% of vote intentions. However, these two Portuguese parties, both to the left of the Socialists, are clearly worth a combined 20% of vote intentions. BE's potential in an actual election is always a bit questionable, as it has a more fickle and volatile electorate. But CDU's performance deserves greater atention. Although the Communists typically have good polls in the middle of electoral cycles and always tend to decline as the election approaches and campaigns start mobilizing other sorts of voters, CDU hasn't had such a consistent string of good results in polls since at least 2005. And let's say they get 10% in the next election. This would be their best score since...1987.
I just published an article on EJPR with the same title as this post. For those of you that may be interested on the subject but not so interested as to read the whole thing, here's an attempted summary.
My point in this article is, I hope, very simple. I question the previous ideas in three ways. First, upon careful rereading of Easton and others, we find that this is not exactly what they conjectured. There's a very nice quote from a 1975 piece by Easton on this subject:
"Diffuse support may also, however, derive from experience. If only because this is a source usually associated with specific support, its significance for diffuse support may easily be overlooked or underemphasized. Members do not come to identify with basic political objects only because they have learned to do so through inducements offered by others – a critical aspect of socialization processes. If they did, diffuse support would have entirely the appearance of a non-rational phenomenon. Rather, on the basis of their own experiences, members may also judge the worth of supporting these objects for their own sake. Such attachment may be a product of spill-over effects from evaluations of a series of outputs and of performance over a long period of time" (Easton 1975: 446)
Others, like Lipset, Dahl or Linz, made similar conjectures. Rational people living under ineffective regimes will sooner or later question their legitimacy.
Second, following recent work on the subject, I argue that one of the reasons why this has not been borne out by the data may be the use of inappropriate measures of regime support. Asking people directly about whether they "prefer democracy to other regimes" or whether they think "democracy is a good thing" is just one way of measuring support. There are different and more indirect ways, which focus more on whether people reject autocratic alternatives or whether they perceive an inevitable trade-off between "democracy" and universally valued outcomes, such as prosperity, decisiveness, and order. If we employ those measures, arguably less prone to "democratic lip service" and demonstrably more valid in cross-national research, maybe we will find that support for democracy is less prevalent than what people think, and more vulnerable to regime performance that what has been suggested.
Third, and finally, I argue that measures of regime performance could focus more on outputs than outcomes. In other words, effectiveness should be measured in terms of the quality of policy formulation and implementation, rather than economic outcomes or the perception of those outcomes. In spite of its arguable failings, there is an available measure that fulfills these criteria and has been used extensively in cross-national research: the World Bank's "government effectiveness" indicator.
What follows is quite simple. I use the World Values Survey integrated data file, construct three measures of regime support - one more "explicit" (EDS), another capturing rejection of autocratic alternatives (DAP), and another capturing whether people reject an inevitable trade-off between democracy and universally valued goals (DPE) - and pose two hypotheses.
H1. In democracies, greater effectiveness is linked to stronger democratic support.
H2. In non-democracies, greater effectiveness is linked to weaker democratic support (this is not really what one would like to test. Instead, one would like to test whether effectiveness in non-democracies increases support for whatever type of non-democracy people live under, but we simply have no good measures of that).
I use a multilevel model applied to data from never less than 50 countries and 76 surveys (depending on the availability of data), taking into account that respondents are clustered in country-years and those in countries, add a series of contextual and individual-level controls (GDP per capita, Ethnic fractionalization, Years under democracy, Income inequality, Age, Gender, Education, Income, Social trust, etc), and estimate the impact of Government effectiveness on the three measures of democratic support in different regime-types ("democracies" vs. "non-democracies", measured in two alternative ways). The take home figure is this, showing the marginal effects of effectiveness on these measures of democratic support:
When we use explicit measures of democratic support, support for H1 is absent. However, when we use alternative measures of support, effectiveness has a relevant positive impact in democratic support in democratic regimes (one standard deviation increase in effectiveness increases democratic support - DAP or DPE - by 2/3 of a standard deviation). Support for H2 is slimmer. Still, several of the marginal effects are negative, and two are significant at conventional levels. In short, effectiveness in democracies is a correlate of democratic support. Note also that all other macro-level predictors fail to perform as some of the literature suggests they should, at least once effectiveness is taken into account.
It's a very simple idea, but I hope it is reasonably well executed. The message is less optimistic than what a democrat would like. Democracies are not immune to the consequences of government ineffectiveness and bad policy-making. Ineffective democracies are likely to suffer in terms of their legitimacy near mass publics. And there are signs, to be confirmed with better data, that effective autocracies may be more stable than what we think, by diminishing demand for democracy and increasing their own legitimacy.
That's it. I plan to continue to work on this issue. Comments very welcome.by Pedro Magalhães